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Abstract 
This paper attempts to analyse the impacts of the ‘fast track’ land reform policy on maize 
production in Zimbabwe through the construction of a partial equilibrium model that depicts 
what could have happened if no further policy shifts had taken place after 2000. The re-
simulated  baseline  model  was  used  to  make  projections  based  on  the  various  trends  of 
exogenous variables in 2000.  This means that the model generated an artificial data set based 
on what the maize market would have looked like under a set of the pre-2000 existent policy 
conditions.  The ‘fast track’ land reform policy was thus assessed based on the performance 
of the baseline model using a range of “what if” assumptions.  Commercial area harvested 
was 39 % less than what could have been harvested in 2001, and declining by negative 
80.57 % in 2007. Results showed total maize production was 61.85 % and 43.88 % less than 
what could have been produced in the 2002 and 2005 droughts, respectively. This may imply 
that  droughts  would  have  been  less  severe  if  the  ‘fast  track’  land  reform  was  not 
implemented.    Therefore,  the  ‘fast  track’  land  reform  had  a  negative  effect  on  maize 
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production. Thus, the econometric model system developed provided a basis through which 
the effects of the FTLRP on the maize market may be analysed and understood.  
 





Over the past four decades, both domestic and trade policy interventions within Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural  sector  have  occurred  within  the  context  of  vast  political  and  socioeconomic 
change.  Key developments in Zimbabwe’s agricultural markets which define its dramatic 
transformation over the last forty years have been marked by three main shifts.  Firstly, maize 
production  has  shifted  in  terms  of  sectoral  contributions,  with  the  communal  sector’s 
contribution  to  total  output  growing  to  an  average  of  60  %  as  the  commercial  farmers 
diversified  into  export  production  (Jayne  et  al.,  1994;  Jenrich,  2008;  Andersson,  2007).  
Secondly, the marketing of grain was transformed from a controlled system to a relatively 
free market dispensation during the 1990s.  This was followed by a re-introduction of price 
controls and marketing restrictions from 2001 to 2008 and, more recently, a shift back to free 
markets operating under a multi-currency system.  Thirdly, with more profound implications, 
was a ‘fast track’ land reform policy that led to the expropriation of approximately 4 000 
commercial farms from 2001 to present (Richardson, 2006; Moyo, 2006; Moyo and Yeros, 
2009).  While this snapshot reflects that the agricultural policy environment and the structure 
of production and marketing have changed tremendously, an important question is what are 
the implications and impacts of such changes on Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. 
 
As such, the broader changing economic and political landscape within which agricultural 
production and marketing takes place warrants a greater need to understand how the policy 
environment impinges on the supply and demand of grain.  Looking at the food crisis in 
context,  there  is  now  a  greater  need  to  continuously  assess  implications  of  the  policy 
decisions  concerning  pricing,  distribution,  production  and  grain  market  structure.    This 
process would facilitate the understanding and timely application of strategic information on 
grain market supply and demand which could enable the adoption of effective decisions and 
marketing strategies.  In addition, it is crucial to develop a more efficient grain market if the 
country’s food security status is to be improved, and this can be achieved, in part, by a 
prognosis of baseline projections and market outlooks that can assist government in taking 
remedial action to correct current market inadequacies.  
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1.1 Research Problem 
 
Over  the  past  decade,  Zimbabwe  has  been  facing  acute  and  persistent  maize  shortages.  
Between 5.2 million and 7.2 million people in Zimbabwe have been in either chronic or 
transient  food  insecurity,  or  both,  since  2001  (Zimbabwe  Emergency  Food  Security 
Assessment  Report, 2002;  Human  Rights  Watch  Group,  2003;  Famine  Early  Warning 
Systems Network (FEWSNET), 2008).  This has led to substantial emergency grain imports 
and food aid that have amounted to a cumulative expenditure of US$ 2.8 billion since 2001 
(Cross, 2008).   
 
The persistence, scale and scope of Zimbabwe’s food crisis reflect that the changes that have 
occurred in the maize sector over time have not been well understood by policy makers. It is 
against recurrent maize shortages that the sector be carefully assessed in order to understand 
the impact of particular policy shifts in the maize market. A landmark shift in policy that has 
inevitably  affected  the  maize  sector  is  the  ‘fast  track’  land  reform  policy.  A  prevailing 
rationale  suggests  that  the  unprecedented  maize  shortfalls  have,  to  a  fair  extent,  been 
triggered by the ‘fast track’ land reform policy implemented in 2001 (Richardson, 2007a; 
Richardson, 2007b).  However, analysing the effect of the ‘fast track’ land reform on the 
maize market is complex, not least because of a combination of other policy factors that have 
also been on-going, but also due to the fact that Zimbabwe experienced droughts in 2002 and 
2005  (Andersson,  2007).    Therefore,  attributing  maize  shortages  to  the  ‘fast  track’  land 
reform policy, given the susceptibility of the market to droughts, remains debatable.  
 
The complex nature of the interface between ‘fast track’ land reforms and food production 
implies that the production impact of Zimbabwe’s ‘fast track’ land reform policy should be 
carefully placed within the scope of agricultural market performance.  In this study, a partial 
equilibrium model is constructed in an attempt to give an elaborate link between the ‘fast 
track’ land reform policy and maize supply and demand within a specific context and market 
setting.  This empirical approach to land reform analysis may allow the reader to reason that 
the model’s baseline or ‘would be’ outcomes against actual ‘fast track’ land reform outcomes 
could be the impact of the ‘fast track’ land reform.  
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2. Background   
 
Industry experts attribute maize production shortfalls in preceding seasons as well as the 
2009/10 production season to a myriad of farm-level challenges emanating from policy and 
non-policy factors. These include a lack of adequate funding, agricultural input shortages and 
limited commercial farming skills.  Yet, given enough support through strategic and timely 
interventions under stable institutional, economic and political conditions such as those that 
existed  before  2000,  Zimbabwe’s  agricultural  sector  may  realise  substantial  increases  in 
productivity.  This is argued since research has established that output per hectare increases 
with reduced farm size in all natural regions of Zimbabwe (Elich, 2005).  
 
However, Richardson (2004) and Richardson (2006) argued that the land redistribution of 
2001 did not achieve the expected increases in production, pointing out the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ associated with the land reform policy’s failure to uphold private property rights 
as a key factor.  Moreover, the indiscriminate seizure of commercial farmland broke the 
structural  link  between  the  communal  and  commercial  farming  sectors,  which  had 
symbiotically  benefited  communal farmers  in  terms  of subsidised fertilizers, inputs,  low-
interest  loans  and  foreign  exchange  generation  for  the  agricultural  sector  (Richardson, 
2007a).  It is against this background that the ‘fast track’ land policy is argued as the cause of 
maize production shortfalls.  
 
In light of this widely-shared opprobrium, an obvious and yet urgent question is the extent of 
the  ‘fast  track’  land  reform  policy’s  impact  on  the  maize  sector.    Although  Richardson 
(2007b) questions what would have happened if the ‘fast track’ land reform had not been 
implemented, Andersson (2007) purports that the argument by Richardson (2007a) was not 
coherent.  Nonetheless, it is Richardson’s (2007a) line of reasoning that forms the thrust of 
the argument that this study seeks to further comprehend.  Even though considerable debate 
has  erupted  over  the  appropriation  of  the  ‘fast  track’  land  programme  as  a  cause  of 
agricultural production shortfalls, the study will not focus on this debate but will rather build 
its argument on how much Zimbabwe could have produced had government not implemented 
the ‘fast track’ land reform programme. 
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The cascade of effects of the expropriation of commercial farms under the ‘fast track’ land 
reform and the subsequent poor agricultural market performance suggest that the paradox of 
Zimbabwe’s  food  crisis  needs  to  be  unpacked  further.    Drawing  from  and  building  on 
Richardson’s (2007b) argument, the question is: would the drop in agricultural production 
have been less severe if ‘fast track’ land reforms had not taken place? This question needs to 
be treated very carefully because the effects of the loss of property rights under the land 
reform  occurred  within  the  context  of  a  complex  and  dynamic  maize  market  that  also 
experienced two droughts in the space of three years.  Naturally, maize markets would take 
time to recover from such phenomenal natural disasters.  In this study, a sound understanding 
of Zimbabwe’s grain trade, marketing and pricing is used in the critical design of the partial 
equilibrium model that will allow a line to be drawn on the ‘fast track’ land reform impacts.   
 
3. Maize Trade, Marketing and Pricing Policy in Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe’s maize market was a net exporting sector that was underpinned by price, market 
policy and weather. Historically, the maize sector was typified by an epoch of interventionist 
market policies. This market system entailed a Grain Marketing Board (GMB) administered 
and fixed pricing system based on a pan-seasonal and pan territorial framework (Muir & 
Muchopa, 2006). Whilst a ‘pseudo free market’ existed during the 1990’s as part of a general 
move towards a more market-oriented development approach, the grain market performance 
during this period however reflected not the impacts of ‘liberalized markets’, but rather a 
mixed  policy  environment  of  legalised  private  grain  trade  within  the  context  of  highly 
interventionist government operations in the grain market (The Food Security Group, 2008). 
This  implied  that instead of  purchasing  the entire marketed surplus as was the objective 
during  the  initial  control  period,  the  GMB  attempted  to  manipulate  maize  market  prices 
through purchase and sale operations, ostensibly for food security and/or price stabilization 
purposes  (ibid).  Within  this  framework,  the  determination  of  domestic  maize  prices  was 
based on policy that would be informed by import parity price trends in the domestic and 
regional maize markets. Thus, policy set the ceiling price at the import parity price and floor 
price  at  the  export  parity  price  respectively,  with  the  price  band  reflecting  market 
fundamentals within which private grain trade regimes operate (Mano, 2003).  
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However, important to note is that Zimbabwe’s maize equilibrium prices seldom occurred 
strictly according to these policy prescriptions. An influence of the government negotiations 
with  Commercial  Farmer’s  Union  (CFU)  lobby  efforts,  and  more  significantly,  factored 
considerations of GMB’s maize forecasts, state of the trading account projections showing 
stock  levels,  expected  purchases  and  sales  income,  transport,  handling  and  storage  costs 
meant  that  the  pricing  framework  remained  fairly  complex  (Takavarasha,  1994).  This 
sentiment is implicitly reflected in the figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: Maize Price Trends  
Source: Data Adapted from Agricultural Statistical Bulletin (2008),  
 
As shown in figure 1 above, real maize price for most years fluctuated around the export 
parity regime, with high production and exports keeping prices relatively lower. Prices in this 
case,  also  seemed  to  be  determined  by  adverse  weather  conditions,  domestic  food  self 
sufficiency and the net trade position, which was highly positive in most years. The sharp 
drop in the net trade in 1993, as an after-effect of the devastating 1992 drought saw only a 
marginal  increase  in  price,  this  reflecting  responses  of  implicit  government  intervention 
through purchase and sale operations in the market that kept prices at low levels. In light of 
the relatively complex nature of Board operations and other exogenous forces acting on the 
maize market, Valdes & Muir-Leresche (1993) deduced a simplified price equation in which   6
the producer price of maize was an additive function of GMB lagged  ending stocks and 
lagged producer prices. They expressed this equation mathematically as: 
 
Equation 1  1 1 1 0 ) ( - - + + = t t t P b ENDSTOCK b b P  
 
In  equation  1,  t P   represents  the  current  GMB  maize  producer  price,  1 - t ENDSTOCK  
represents the lagged closing stock and  1 - t P  represents the lagged producer prices. According 
to this equation, government’s maize prices were determined by previous year’s prices and 
available stocks at the end of the season.  
 
However, this equation may be overly simplified, not capturing the influence of the regional 
markets on domestic prices, and therefore the salient market features that sufficiently depict 
the influence of maize trade and policy. Given the fact that markets fluctuated around the 
export parity prices (as shown in figure 1), this suggests that parity prices may have been 
somewhat  correlated  with  domestic  prices.    Industry  experts  argue  that  under  structural 
market adjustments, maize trade was driven by regional prices, adverse weather conditions, 
location, and to some extent arbitrage opportunities. From this perspective, it may thus be 
plausible to model the domestic price as a function of the parity prices, although domestic 
prices would be regarded in this case as predetermined in the domestic market system. The 
exchange rate is factored into the domestic prices, and linked to regional maize prices to 
reflect the influence of the regional markets on the domestic prices.  
 
4. The Analytical Model 
 
Given the relatively complex nature of price determination and the influence of other trade 
and  policy  factors  that impact  on  domestic  maize  markets,  partial  equilibrium  modelling 
becomes a uniquely useful way of analysing Zimbabwe’s maize sector.  
 
The strength of partial equilibrium modelling as a way of understanding the Zimbabwean 
maize market rests in several of its strengths. Firstly, using partial equilibrium analysis is 
empirically simple and the analysis thereof reasonably approximates the general effects of 
trade policy changes where weak links between commodities and their supplier or output   7
sectors  may  exist  (Perali, 2003).  Secondly,  partial  equilibrium  analysis  provides  useful 
information on the impact of trade and policy changes at very detailed product and sectoral 
levels, hence allowing for the utilization of widely available trade data (Lang, 2006; Thurlow 
et al., 2005; Wubehen, 2006). To add, the process of regional and global integration presents 
far  reaching  implications  for  the  domestic  farming  sector  and  the  related  supply  and 
marketing issues in the economy, making partial equilibrium models a uniquely significant 
way of  presenting the integrated nature  of local, regional and world  agricultural markets 
(Meyer, 2005).  
 
Thus, from a partial equilibrium perspective, Zimbabwe’s maize market can be conceptually 
illustrated  as  shown  in  figure  2  below.  The  illustration  below  depicts  that  Zimbabwe’s 
domestic  prices  are  influenced  by  regional  price  trends.  This  goes  along  the  opinion  of 
industry  experts  and  scholars  such  as  Takavarasha  (1994),  who  argued  that  Zimbabwe’s 
maize markets since the 1980’s were influenced by regional parity price trends that informed 
price  negotiations,  in  addition  to  weather  issues.  In  this  case,  prices  are  modelled  as  a 
function of parity prices as discussed, and net trade is thus used to close the model in the 




Figure 2:  Diagram illustrating Zimbabwe’s maize market model 
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Now, a typical partial equilibrium model, as outlined in figure 2 above, consists of domestic 
supply, demand, trade and price components. The components of the model contain a set of 
simultaneous equations which solve for an equilibrium price in the maize market. In the sub-
sections below, each component is discussed in detail. 
 
4.1 The Supply Component  
Begging stock and production make up the maize supply component. Beginning stocks in 
period t are taken as ending stock in period t-1 and this lagged relationship is illustrated by 
the dotted line in figure 2. Production is made up of area and yield, and area in this case is 
modelled as follows:  
 








t t t - - =  
 
From this equation, farmers’ current area planted under maize ( t AREA ) considers the lagged 
area for maize ( 1 - t AREA ), current producer price of maize (
m
t P ) and/or lagged maize prices 
(
m
t P 1 - ), maize substitute price (
s
t P ), input price (
i
t P ), rainfall ( t RAIN ) and the government 
policies (G ).The equation 2 above is modelled for the communal and commercial sectors 
respectively.  
 
The yield equation is modelled, for the communal and commercial sectors respectively, as a 
function of rainfall: 
 
Equation 3  ) , ( t t t e RAIN f YIELD =  
 
The production for maize per each sector is then calculated as an identity equation of the 
product of the yield and area harvested (proxy for area planted).  
 
Equation 4  t t t YIELD AREA MZPROD * =  
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The total maize produced ( t MZPROD ) is taken as the summation of the commercial sector 
and communal sector maize production. In each year, the lagged production is complemented 
by food aid. The food aid equation was estimated as a function of production: 
 
Equation 5  ) , ( 1 e MZPROD f AID t t - =  
 
4.2 The Demand Component  
The demand component consists of human consumption; feed, seed, and ending stock. Seed 
data is inaccurate while feed data is largely unavailable. Therefore, feed and seed data as well 
as unaccounted on-farm consumption are taken as the remainder of the balance between 
supply and demand.  Hence in the demand component, ending stock and human consumption 
and a residual are modelled.  
 
Ending stock is modelled as a function of lagged ending stocks (begging stock) ( 1 - t ENDS ), 
lagged real maize prices (
m
t P 1 - ) and current production ( t MZPROD ).  
 
Equation 6  ) , , ( 1 1 t
m
t t t MZPROD P ENDS f ENDS - - =   
 
Human demand on the other hand was modelled as a per capita consumption equation; where 
per capita consumption ( t PCC ) was expressed as a function of real prices of maize (
m
t P ), 
price of substitute (
s
t P ), and per capita GDP ( t PCGDP ) as a proxy for income.  
 




t t PCGDP P P f PCC =  
 
The unaccounted stock, referred to as a residual ( t RES ), was postulated to be a function of 
production ( t MZPROD ) and current prices (
m
t P ).  
 
Equation 8  ) , , ( Dummy P MZPROD f RES
m
t t t =  
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A dummy variable was put on the years in which the residual assumed negative values, and 
this reflects that the data was not sound.  
 
4.3 The Trade Component 
The trade component of the model was an identity equation for net trade (net exports) which 
in  this  case  formed  the  closing  identity.  The  equation  was  defined  as  beginning  stock 
( t BEGS )  plus  total  maize  production  ( t MZPROD )  minus  human  consumption  ( t CONS ) 
minus ending stock ( t ENDS ) minus residual stock ( t RES ) (which constitutes livestock feed, 
seed and unaccounted on-farm consumption) in time t: 
 
Equation 9  t t t t t t RES ENDS CONS MZPROD BEGS NT - - - + =  
 
3.4 The Price Component  
The  price  component  was  modelled  as  a  function  of  border  prices,  which  in  turn  are  a 
function of regional prices (
w
t P ) and exchange rate ( t EXCH ), a transport differential from 
Randfontein to Harare ( t TRNS ) and government taxes (G ). 
 




t =  
 
This price is simulated by linking the domestic price to the regional market price and solving 
the domestic market supply and demand.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
The  estimated  results  of  8  behavioural  equations  outlined  in  the  preceding  section  were 
derived from Generalised least Squares (GLS) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations 
in SPSS software. Having estimated the equations, the simulation model was thus constructed 
in an EXCEL spreadsheet, calibrated to the base year 2000 and then validated by examining   11
its predictive ability for the period between 1992 and 2000. To enable the generation of a 
baseline, the model required to be ‘solved’ in EXCEL for a period during which the FTLRP 
was implemented. Using the multipliers generated in from the regressions, the exogenous 
variables were held constant at the 2000 level so as to generate solutions for the endogenous 
variables. 
 
Important to note however, is the fact that the results were examined for consistency with a 
priori knowledge on Zimbabwe’s maize production, demand and trade conditions. With the 
assistance, judgement and discretion of maize industry experts and from literature which 
provided general information, maize market commodity knowledge was incorporated into the 
projection  results.  The  consistency  of  the  projection  results  was  examined  mainly  by 
comparing the net trade position projected by production, demand and trading for maize with 
the actual export and import differences.  
 
5.1 Model Assumptions 
 
The influence of the ‘fast track’ land reform on exports, GDP, inflation and exchange rate 
meant  that  various  assumptions  had  to  be  made  regarding  the  values  of  the  exogenous 
variables during the period the ‘fast track’ land reform was effected so as to remove its 
effects. The study therefore assumed that the agricultural policy and the macro-economic 
environment that existed in 1999 continued into the future period. From this context, the 
baseline projections should therefore be considered as a market outlook rather than a forecast. 
 
Projections for the GDP and the exchange rate were obtained from Global Insight (1999) and 
the World Bank provided population estimates. According to Global Insight (1999), the GDP 
was projected to increase to ZW$ 28.21 billion in 2005. The exchange rate was projected to 
depreciate  consistently  to  ZW$  102.5/  US$  in  2005.  The  World  Bank  estimated  that 
population increased to 12.46 million in 2008. Table 1 below displays the projections of the 
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Table 1:  Projections of Exogenous Variables  
Variable  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
GDP (ZW$ billions)
a  25.64  26.17  26.61  27.36  28.21  28.83  29.46 
Exch. rate (ZW$/US$)
a  82.50  87.50  92.50  97.50  102.50  108.06  113.92 
Rainfall (mm)
b  728.6  465.7  602.0  712.3  529.0  835.7  946.2 
Population (millions)
c  12.50  12.52  12.51  12.50  12.48  12.46  12.45 
Source: 
aGlobal Insight (1999), 
b AIAS (Various Issues), 
cWorld Bank (2010)  
 
NB: GDP and Exchange Rate are given at 2000 prices 
 
Projections from Global Insight (1999) were made at a time when the ‘fast track’ land reform 
was not anticipated.  Also, projections were made on the assumption that the then quasi-free 
market conditions, macro-economic, political and institutional environment that was in place 
in 2000 persisted into the ‘fast track’ land reform period.  
 
To  further  strengthen the argument, the baseline  model incorporated ‘actual’ rainfall and 
population values since the data for the period of the ‘fast track’ land reform was available. 
This would allow for the determination of droughts that occurred in the projection period, 
which would also improve the performance of the model.  
 
5.2 The Re-simulated Baseline 
 
Based  on  the  assumptions  discussed  in  the  preceding  section,  the  model  generated  an 
artificial dataset of ‘would be’ outcomes without the ‘fast track’ land reform. This market 
outlook of the Zimbabwean maize sector is technically referred to in this  study as a re-
simulated baseline.  Thus, the outlook reflects the general picture of the Zimbabwean maize 
sector if  no ‘fast track’ land  reform  occurred.  This  implies that the performance of  the 
market in the re-simulated baseline is founded on the assumption that no ‘fast track’ land 
reform took place in 2000 and stable political and macro-economic conditions prevailed.  The 
‘fast track’ land reform policy decision can thus be assessed by looking at the differences 
between the baseline and the actual market values of what occurred during the land reform 
era.  
 
The maize sector was affected to various extents by the dynamic interplay of four variables 
which shall be unpacked under this section.   These include GDP, exchange rate, rainfall and   13
land transfers between the communal and commercial sectors.  Theoretically, the consistent 
fall in actual GDP translates to a fall in per capita income and therefore a collapse in demand.   
The consistent depreciation in the exchange rate caused by a dwindling export base had an 
effect on the price incentives which influenced farmer responses, and therefore area planted, 
which in turn affected production.  There is also the influence of rainfall on production which 
has been widely debated in the literature.  Then, during the same period, there were on-going 
land transfers between the communal and commercial sectors, whose composition affects 
yield  and  output.  Important  to  note  is  that  land  transfers  between  the  communal  and 
commercial sectors were still going to occur even if the ‘fast track’ land reform programme 
was not  implemented  because there still  existed a framework for  land  acquisition  before 
2000.  The model therefore attempted to unpack each of these aspects under two scenarios. 
The scenario presented below, called the ‘fast track’ land reform scenario, compares the re-
simulated baseline against actual outcomes to show the impact of the policy on the maize 
sector taking into account the effects of rainfall, exchange rate and per capita income.  
 
Scenario: The ‘Fast Track’ Land Reform Policy 
 
A comparison of the ‘actual’ outcomes versus the re-simulated baseline is displayed in Table 
2 below.  In the table, the re-simulated baseline is stated as ‘baseline’, and these two terms 
are used interchangeably because they technically hold the same meaning.  A baseline is a 
market benchmark against which various policies are analysed, and in this study, the term ‘re-
simulated baseline’ implies that the benchmark is re-set against a retroactive market scenario 
ex-post facto. The percentage change displayed in the table represents the difference between 
the re-simulated baseline and what actually occurred in the maize market.  This difference 
represents the ‘fast track’ land reform policy’s impact on the maize sector.  Important to note 
is that the ‘baseline’ outlined in Table 2 for each endogenous variable reflects the benchmark 
of Zimbabwe’s maize market and the model’s full response to rainfall, but not any other 
policy shock.  This sets the study’s argument into perspective, as  the model’s  simulated 
output gives a logical and empirical basis upon which to respond to unsubstantiated claims of 
the ‘fast track’ land reform policy’s influence on maize production taking into account the 
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Table 2:  Impact of the ‘Fast Track’ Land Reform Policy 
   2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Commercial Area   ‘000 tonnes 
Baseline  145.63  122.66  124.85  131.38  118.40  138.83  147.28 
Actual  155.89  128.83  126.58  93.01  70.44  62.84  55.68 
% Change  7.04  5.04  1.39  -29.21  -40.50  -54.73  -62.19 
Communal Area   ‘000 tonnes 
Baseline  1350.42  1319.26  1382.96  1474.91  1463.72  1606.94  1713.14 
Actual  1084.10  1199.02  1225.79  1400.80  1659.42  1650.16  1390.13 
% Change  -19.72  -9.11  -11.36  -5.02  13.37  2.69  -18.85 
Total Area Harvested  ‘000 tonnes 
Baseline  1496.05  1441.92  1507.81  1606.29  1582.12  1745.76  1860.42 
Actual  1239.99  1327.85  1352.37  1493.81  1729.87  1713.00  1445.82 
% Change  -17.12  -7.91  -10.31  -7.00  9.34  -1.88  -22.29 
Commercial Yield   tonnes/ha 
Baseline  4.20  3.15  3.69  4.13  3.40  4.57  4.82 
Actual  3.42  2.28  1.91  1.94  1.11  1.57  1.45 
% Change  -18.63  -27.55  -48.37  -53.12  -67.45  -65.55  -69.81 
Communal Yield  tonnes/ha 
Baseline  0.85  0.78  0.82  0.85  0.80  0.87  0.89 
Actual  0.92  0.26  0.67  1.08  0.51  0.84  0.78 
% Change  7.80  -66.96  -18.51  26.99  -36.88  -3.93  -12.71 
Total Production  ‘000 tonnes 
Baseline  1759.97  1420.65  1593.07  1791.45  1574.08  2039.26  2234.16 
Actual  1526.48  604.67  1058.98  1686.02  916.06  1485.04  1161.10 
% Change  -13.27  -57.44  -33.53  -5.89  -41.80  -27.18  -48.03 
Maize Prices  ZW$/tonne 
Baseline  53.07  53.84  55.32  57.66  59.25  62.88  65.97 
Actual  87.25  69.28  152.61  81.26  79.32  84.45  100.86 
% Change  64.41  28.68  175.85  40.92  33.87  34.30  52.89 
Net Trade  ‘000 tonnes 
Baseline  405.26  -436.01  355.71  627.39  -8.09  830.56  850.53 
Actual  -88.66  -763.59  -340.17  -184.90  -685.98  -250.66  -385.65 
% Change  -121.88  75.13  -195.63  -129.47  8383.33  -130.18  -145.34 
Total Domestic Use  ‘000 tonnes 
Baseline  2923.07  2049.00  2093.93  2283.65  2081.54  2529.79  2761.70 
Actual  2689.57  684.67  1178.98  1756.02  1036.06  1605.04  1281.10 
% Change  -7.99  -66.59  -43.70  -23.10  -50.23  -36.55  -53.61 
Source: Model Results 
 
 
One important point the model captures is the influence of rainfall on the maize market.  
While previous arguments in support of the ‘fast track’ land reform policy have stressed that 
droughts have been the main cause of Zimbabwe’s food crisis, the model shows that the 
effects of droughts would have been far less severe if the pre-2001 maize market conditions 
had persisted into the ‘fast track’ land reform period.  As shown in Table 2 above, maize 
production in 2002 would have been 1.42 million tonnes, which is above the 604 000 tonnes 
actually produced under the ‘fast track’ land reform policy.  In the 2005 drought season, 
1.574 million tonnes of maize output could have been produced against the actual 916 000   15
tonnes.  The maize market therefore produced 57.44 % and 41.8 % less output than what 
could  have  been  produced  in  the  2002  and  2005  droughts  had  the  government  not 
implemented  land  reform.    Moreover,  maize  produced  in  2006  and  2007  would  have 
surpassed 2 million tonnes under the pre-2001 pseudo-free market system and agricultural 
policies.    Thus,  in  2007,  maize  production  was  48  %  less  what  the  market  could  have 
produced without the land reform policy. 
 
Maize Area Harvested  
 
The impact of the ‘fast track’ land reform on sectoral maize area harvested is difficult to 
gauge due  to the restructuring and shifts  of land between and across the communal and 
commercial  sectors.    However,  from  an  abstract  point  of  view,  we  may  take  the  area 
harvested  between  the  respective  sectors  as  per  definition  of  commercial  and  communal 
sectors outlined in Chapter two.  
 
The results of the re-simulated baseline shown in Table 2 above indicate that the commercial 
area harvested was negatively affected by the expropriation of commercial farms.  The ‘fast 
track’ land reform policy shift caused land transfers from the commercial to the communal 
sector, with perhaps much of the loss in area planted being due to the stalling of farming 
operations due to unrest and uncertainty.  Comparatively, the area harvested was 39 % less 
than what could have been harvested in the first year, and this decline continued throughout 
the next six years.  Throughout the ‘fast track’ land reform period, commercial area planted 
declined and was on average 61 % below its potential within the period from 2001 to 2007.  
The long run impact of the ‘fast track’ land reform on commercial area harvested was a 
negative  80.57  %  in  2007  (see  Table  2).    The  expropriation  of  commercial  farms  thus 
severely reduced the commercial maize area planted.   
 
Potentially, the maize area planted by the commercial sector could have fluctuated above 
234 000 hectares if the ‘fast track’ land reform was not implemented.  As shown by the graph 
in Figure 3 below, maize area planted could have peaked at 277 000 hectares in 2002, and 
surpassed 286 thousand hectares in 2007.  Marginal declines would have occurred in the 
drought years of 2003 and 2005, with area harvested falling to 234.06 thousand and 240 
thousand hectares, respectively.  As the re-simulated baseline depicted on the graph below,   16
the commercial area harvested without the ‘fast track’ land reform would have been well 
above 150 000 hectares throughout the period under consideration.  
 
Higher  levels  of  commercial  area  harvested  would  have  presumably  been  driven  by  the 
increase in the importance of the feed market, as feed use was set to increase following the 
increase  in  stock  feed  prices  that  necessitated  the  need  for  farm-based  feed  production.  
Additionally, the growing significance of the beef and livestock exports within the region and 
to the European Union market was expected to play a greater role in driving the increase in 
commercial land area under maize.   
 
The baseline results show that actual communal sector area harvested would have initially 
been below the baseline up to 2003.  At this point, the question is why the actual communal 
area harvested remained lower than the re-simulated baseline given that the ‘fast track’ land 
reform had allocated land to the communal sector?  It could be due to depressed maize prices 
in 2001 which could have discouraged the farmer’s land area allocated to maize.  Perhaps, it 
could have been the uncertainty around political connotations over the land reform, as well as 
the outcome of the 2003 elections could have made some communal farmers uncertain of 
taking up more land.  Although possible explanations exist, it is important to remember that 
land transfers were on-going before 2000, and the model captures these through trends in area 
harvested between the communal and commercial sectors.  Therefore, it may be argued that 
the previous land acquisition framework would have led to more communal area harvested in 
the first three years of the model’s projections.  
 
The ‘fast track’ land reform impacts on communal area harvested can only be visibly seen 
from 2004 onwards, where the actual communal area harvested went up to 15.57 % above the 
baseline projections in 2004 (see Table 2).  This may have been due to reaffirmations from 
the 2003 presidential elections and the political commitment through the increased allocation 
of land.  The communal area harvested continued to respond positively to the land reform in 
2005 and 2006 with areas being 35.98 % and 39.51 % above baseline projections.  However, 
the 2007 communal area harvested equated actual area harvested.  This may imply that in the 
long run, the ‘fast track’ land reform had no significant impact on communal area harvested, 
as market based land reform would have been the same as ‘fast track’ land reform in the sixth 
year after the policy shift.   17
 
















































































Total Maize Area Harvested Re-simulated Baseline
Total Maize Area Harvested Actual
Total Maize Area Harvested % Change from Baseline
 
Figure 4:  Total Maize Area Harvested: Re-simulated Baseline vs Actual  
Source:  Model results  
 
From  an  aggregate  national  perspective,  total  maize  area  harvested  was  18.48  %  below 
potential in 2001.  Total area harvested was below the baseline in 2002, 2003 and 2007, with 
‘actual’ national area harvested at 15.85 %, 8.04 % and 13.68 % less than areas that could 
have been harvested, respectively.  From 2004 to 2006, ‘actual’ national areas harvested were 
above the baseline, as the ‘fast track’ land reform had a 2.91 %, 16.53 % and a 20.38 % 
positive impact in 2004, 2005 and 2006  respectively.  
 
Total Maize Production 
  
The baseline model showed that actual total production was much less than potential during 
the ‘fast track’ land reform period.  A graphical illustration of the baseline against actual 
values shows that the baseline is in essence an upward shift of the actual output trajectory in   18
the years of the land reform period (see Figure 7.5 below).  This means that Zimbabwe’s 































Re-simulated Baseline Actual Production
 
Figure 5:   Total Maize Production 
Source: Model Results 
 
Visual inspection of the baseline on total maize output thus shows that the baseline model 
almost mimics the trajectory pattern of actual output, with the expected drops in output in the 
2002/03 and 2004/05 drought seasons being observed.  
 
Total production was 25.34 % less than what could have been produced in 2001, the year that 
the ‘fast track’ land reform policy was formally implemented.  Even in the 2002/03 drought, 
output was 61.85 % less and 36.81 % less than what could have actually been produced for 
the  2002  and  2003  seasons,  respectively.    In  the  2005  drought  season,  the  total  maize 
production was 43.88 % less than what could have been produced without land reform and 
under a stable macro-economic and political environment.  In 2007, the baseline showed that 
the nation could have produced almost 50 % more than what was actually produced.   19
 
The baseline expected the total maize output to continue to recover after the 2005 drought to 
reach output levels above 2 million tonnes, against a drop in actual output.  This divergence 
may be attributed to the uncertain political and economic environment triggered by the ‘fast 
track’ land reforms.  Since the ‘fast track’ land reform impacted on maize production, it 
therefore follows that these reforms had ripple negative implications on net maize trade.   
 
Net Maize Trade 
 
The net maize trade is the volume of exports minus imports.  The actual net trade position has 
been negative since 1999 and this trend persisted after the expropriation of the commercial 
farms as shown in Figure 7.6 below.  The persistent negative maize trade has been partly 
attributed to the discretionary ban of exports after the collapse of the strategic reserve policy.  
 
The assumption made on the re-simulated baseline was that the ban was lifted and exports 
resumed.   Assuming  that exports  resumed  in 2001, the baseline  revealed  that Zimbabwe 
should have remained a net exporter throughout the ‘fast track’ land reform period, except in 
2002.  The re-simulated baseline depicts that the highest net maize trade would have been 
achieved in 2006 and 2007, reaching above 800 000 tonnes.  The net maize trade was going 
to fall in 2002 to a deficit of 509 000 tonnes due to an acute drought.  The 2005 drought was 
again expected to reduce the net trade position to below 20 000 tonnes, following which it 
was expected to recover afterwards.  
 
Yet, throughout the reform era, Zimbabwe has had to import substantial amounts of maize in 
addition to the food aid that it has received owing to insufficient production.  According to 
the re-simulated baseline, net maize trade would have remained positive except in the 2002 
drought.  This is because maize import demand would have been partially offset by high 
production.  High levels of production and exports after 2000 were expected to be the major 
driver of positive maize net trade.  As the baseline results reveal, without the ‘fast track’ land 
reform, net maize trade was going to be positive in 2001 and from 2003 onwards, with  the 
maintained positive net trade emanating from the higher levels of total production, that would 
have led to higher levels of exports.  
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Net Trade: Re-simulated Baseline Net Trade: Actual Change in Maize Price  
 
Figure 6:  Maize Net Trade 
Source: Model results 
Since the literature points out that net trade was an important consideration in the setting up 
of prices, Figure 6 sets out the price effect that the impact of the net exports would have had 
on the market.  Maize prices were going to change by an average of ZW$ 34.18 in 2001.  The 
2002 change in net trade was going to induce a change of ZW$ 97.29, the highest impact in 
the seven year period.    
 
Total Domestic Use 
 
Figure 7 below reveals that demand for maize collapsed and this is shown by the fairly large 
differences  between  the  re-simulated  baseline  of  what  could  have  happened  under  stable 
conditions and what eventually occurred under conditions of declining per capita GDP and 
under-production.    The  per  capita  consumption  of  maize  declined  sharply  from  110 
kg/person/year in 2001 to 92 kg/person/year in 2002.  Since then, per capita consumption has 
not gone beyond 98 kg/person/year reflecting the slump in demand during the period of the 






















































































Total  Domestic Use: Re-Simulated Baseline Total  Domestic Use: Actual
Per Capita Consumption Actual
 
Figure 7:   Total Domestic Use 
Source:  Model Results 
 
According to the results of the model, the largest impact on total domestic use was in 2002, 
2005 and 2007 in which  domestic consumption  was 66.6 %, 50.2 % and 53.6  % below 
potential, respectively.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The main aim of the article was to re-assess and model the impact of the ‘fast track’ land 
reform on the maize market. We have tried to address this issue from the viewpoint that 
analysing the ‘fast track’ land reform impact is complex given the intricacy of agricultural 
markets. The study proposed that the ‘fast track’ land reform impact may be elicited from 
how the market would have performed under the assumption that the ‘fast track’ land reform 
was not implemented. The authors feel that if these pointers are ignored or continue to be 
neglected, the argument on ‘fast track’ land reform impacts may be misinformed, mystifying 
and  distorted.  It  is  hoped  that  this  article  will  provoke  a  re-think  of  policy  analysis  of   22
Zimbabwe’s food crisis and trigger discussion on how to fully integrate land reform policy 
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